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Comments
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine
Republic: An Alien Tort Statute Exception to
Foreign Sovereign Immunity
INTRODUCTION
During the Falkland Islands war between Argentina and
Great Britain,1 Argentine aircraft attacked an oil tanker in in-
ternational waters in the South Atlantic.2 The vessel sustained
extensive damage and had to be scuttled at a loss of nearly $12
million.3 After unsuccessfully trying to pursue their damages
claim in Argentina, the Liberian corporations that owned and
chartered the tanker sued the Argentine government in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
1. The dispute over claims to the Falkland, or Malvinas, Islands arose in
April 1982 when Argentina invaded the islands. See Rubin, Historical and
Legal Background of the Falklands/Malvinas Dispute, in THE FALIaNDS
WAR: LESSONS FOR STRATEGY, DIPLOMACY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (A.
Coll & A. Arend eds. 1985).
2. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 423
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988). Because the width of the
tanker prevented passage through the locks of the Panama Canal, the tanker
sailed around the southern tip of South America en route from Alaska to the
Virgin Islands. On June 8, 1982, while the empty tanker was returning to
Alaska, Argentine military aircraft attacked without provocation or warning.
See Joint Brief for Appellants at 5-6, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argen-
tine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (No. 86-7602), cer, granted, 108 S. Ct.
1466 (1988). Because an unexploded bomb remained lodged in the hull of the
ship when it arrived in port at Rio de Janeiro, the owner of the tanker had to
scuttle it 250 miles off the Brazilian coast. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988). The United States Department
of State delivered a formal demarche to the Argentine Embassy protesting the
bombing. Joint Brief for Appellants at 7.
3. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423. United Carriers, a Liberian corpora-
tion, owned the tanker. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 73. Plaintiff Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., also a Liberian corporation, had time-chartered the ves-
sel to carry Alaskan North Slope crude oil to a refinery in the Virgin Islands.
Id. United Carriers estimated its loss at $10 million. Amerada Hess sought
damages of $1.9 million for the loss of the tanker's fuel supply. See Joint Brief
for Appellants at 8.
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York.4 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act (FSIA).5  In Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Argentine Republic,6 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that
although the FSIA did not provide the district court with juris-
diction, the Alien Tort Statute 7 did.8
Under the FSIA, foreign states generally are immune from
the jurisdiction of United States courts. The Act provides lim-
ited exceptions to this general immunity. Amerada Hess raises
the issue of whether Congress intended the FSIA to provide
the exclusive framework for resolving claims of foreign sover-
eign immunity. The decision adds another exception to sover-
eign immunity to those allowed under the FSIA and gives the
199-year-old Alien Tort Statute a complementary role in deter-
mining when courts may exercise jurisdiction over foreign
states. As a result, plaintiffs barred by the FSIA from suing
foreign states may be able to invoke the Alien Tort Statute to
establish federal subject matter jurisdiction.
This Comment analyzes the intended scope of the FSIA
and the role, if any, that the Alien Tort Statute should play in
resolving issues of foreign sovereign immunity. Part I exam-
ines the history of foreign sovereign immunity in the United
States before and after the passage of the FSIA and reviews
previous interpretations of the Alien Tort Statute. Part II ana-
lyzes the court's opinion in Amerada Hess and argues that the
Alien Tort Statute is inapplicable to determinations of foreign
sovereign immunity claims. Part III proposes that Congress
amend the Alien Tort Statute to conform to the policies under-
lying the FSIA. The Comment concludes that the Amerada
Hess court inappropriately circumvented the FSIA by resorting
4. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 423.
5. See Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 77; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982) (provisions regarding federal district court ju-
risdiction and sovereign immunity). Because the facts of the case did not bring
it within one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity codified in the FSIA,
the district court held that the Argentine government was immune from its
jurisdiction. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 75, 77.
6. 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). This statute sometimes is referred to as the
Alien Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., Note, A Legal Lohengrin: Federal Jurisdic-
tion Under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 105 (1979).
8. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 428-29. This is the holding of the two judge
majority of the panel. Judge Kearse wrote a separate dissent favoring dismis-
sal of the action under the FSIA. Id. at 429-31.
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to the Alien Tort Statute to find jurisdiction over Argentina be-
cause Congress intended the FSIA to provide the exclusive
means for determining when United States courts may exercise
jurisdiction over foreign states.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMmuNI AND THE FSIA
If a citizen of one nation sues the government of another
for breach of contract, for a tort, or over a property dispute, the
foreign government might raise the defense of sovereign immu-
nity. The doctrine of sovereign immunity in international law9
provides that a sovereign state ° is immune from the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of other states.1 ' The principle originated in
an era when the state and its ruler were considered one,12
when kings theoretically could do no wrong, and when the ex-
ercise of authority by one sovereign over another denoted supe-
9. International law is the law applicable to states in their mutual rela-
tions and to individuals in their relations with states. P. JESSUP, A MODERN
LAW OF NATIONS 17 (1948). Its sources are international treaties; international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; and the general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations. See Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(a)-(c), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No.
933. Rules of international law fall into the categories of treaty law and cus-
tomary international law. See Gamble, The Treaty/Custom Dichotomy: An
Overview, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 305, 305-06 (1981). Treaty law consists of express
obligations set forth in international agreements freely adhered to by states,
while customary international law consists of obligations inferred from state
practice. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
UCLA L. REV. 665, 669 (1986).
10. International law defines a state as "an entity which has a defined ter-
ritory and permanent population, under the control of its own government,
and which engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with
other such entities." 1 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). States act only
through actions or omissions by human beings or human collectivities, and acts
attributed to a state at the international level are those of its organs or agents.
L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAW 521 (2d
ed. 1987) [hereinafter cited as HENKIN]. A state, therefore, is responsible for
any violation of its obligations under international law resulting from action or
inaction by its government, government authorities, political subdivisions, or
any organ, agency, official, employee, or other agent of its government acting
within the scope of its authority or functions. 1 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 207 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1985). In this Comment the terms sovereign, state, nation, and government de-
note a state as defined and described above.
11. See T. GITrTARi, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1970).
12. Note, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The De-
fined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 170 (1986).
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riority or antagonism.'3 More recently, courts have used the
doctrine to avoid embarrassing those responsible for the con-
duct of a nation's foreign relations.14 Proponents of one theory
argue that immunity is a fundamental right of the sovereign
state as an equal among nations.' 5 A second group of theorists
views the extension of jurisdictional immunities to foreign sov-
ereigns as motivated by practical necessity and the desire to
promote reciprocal courtesies among nations.' 6
Whether rooted in sovereign rights or considerations of
comity, sovereign immunity has become an established princi-
ple of international law.17 In United States law,18 courts origi-
13. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1964), cert denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
For a detailed discussion of the roots of sovereign immunity, see Hill, A Policy
Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50 FORDHAM L.
REv. 155, 158-62 (1981).
14. Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Immunity of Foreign
Sovereign from Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 A.L.R. 3d 322, 334 (1969).
In United States law, the analogous, judicially created Act of State doc-
trine provides that United States courts will not determine the validity under
international law of a foreign state's acts committed within its own territory.
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-17 (1964). The Act
of State doctrine, unlike sovereign immunity, does not require a court to de-
cline to exercise jurisdiction. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985). The doctrine instead requires the court to refrain from passing on
the merits of certain issues. See id. Although the Supreme Court developed
the Act of State doctrine as a principle of judicial restraint, the doctrine is re-
lated in spirit to international law rules of sovereign immunity. See RESTATE-
MENT (REvISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
469 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
15. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 266-67 (7th ed. 1955) (stating
that courts of most countries treat principle of sovereign immunity as rule of
international law); The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 137 (1812) (stating that jurisdictional immunity is rooted in "perfect equal-
ity and absolute independence of sovereigns").
16. T. GIURrARI, supra note 11, at 6. Those who believe that jurisdictional
immunities are rooted in the desire for comity among nations view such immu-
nity as a privilege granted politically, rather than as a right of sovereignty ob-
served out of a sense of legal obligation. See Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign
Before United States Courts, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 455, 455 (1970); compare I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 326 (3d ed. 1979) (stat-
ing that rationale for jurisdictional immunities rests equally on dignity of for-
eign nation, its organs and representatives, and on functional need to leave
them unencumbered in pursuit of their functions) with T. GnrrrAPm, supra
note 11, at 6 (stating that those who believe sovereign immunity to have
originated out of comity acknowledge that it had become accepted rule of
international law by end of nineteenth century).
17. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 171 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). But see G. BADR, STATE IMMU-
NITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 135 & n.100 (1984) (denying
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nally applied the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity.19
This doctrine provides that a state may not be sued over any
matter in the courts of other nations without its consent.20
Since 1952 the United States has favored the restrictive ap-
proach to sovereign immunity.21 The restrictive doctrine of
existence in customary international law of rule requiring grant of immunity
to foreign states).
18. International law is a part of the law of the United States. See The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropri-
ate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination."). For a discussion of how international
law became a part of United States law, see HENKIN, supra note 10, at 144-46.
See also Note, Enforcing the Customary International Law of Human Rights
in Federal Court, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 161 n.202 (1986) (discussing various
theories of jurisprudential basis for incorporation of international law into
United States law).
Under the Constitution United States treaties are the supreme law of the
land, subject to the constitutional limitations that apply to all exercises of fed-
eral power. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; HENKIN, supra note 10, at 183-84. In the
case of a conflict between a federal statute and a self-executing treaty, the one
last in date controls. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). It has not
been authoritatively determined, however, whether a rule of customary inter-
national law that developed after the enactment of a conflicting federal statute
should be given effect as the law of the United States. 1 RESTATEMENT (RE-
VISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 135 comment
d (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
19. See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812); T. GIUTTARI, supra note 11, at 8-9 (discussing The Schooner Exchange).
Communist and some third world states still espouse the absolute doctrine of
immunity. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 891.
20. See T. GIUTTARI, supra note 11, at 8-9; see also HENKN, supra note 10,
at 891 (stating that under absolute theory, state may invoke immunity irre-
spective of nature of its sovereign activities).
21. See OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No.
8960, 1977 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 1022
(1979). In 1952 Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Department of State,
set forth the State Department's position on future sovereign immunity claims
in a letter to the acting Attorney General. The "Tate Letter" concluded that
the State Department thereafter would follow the restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 173 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
Plaintiffs whose claims are barred even under the restrictive theory of im-
munity usually will receive compensation only if the state of their nationality
seeks and obtains an international legal remedy. See HENKIN, supra note 10,
at 1040 (stating that if private claimant fails to obtain redress for his or her
injury under laws of state alleged to have violated his or her rights, state of
claimant's nationality may press claim on state-to-state level); see generally
Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO
ALIENS 1 (R. Lillich ed. 1983) (describing historical development of, contempo-
rary challenges to, and future prospects for, international law of state respon-
sibility). A state may pursue such remedies through diplomatic negotiation or
1988]
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sovereign immunity permits suits against a foreign state en-
gaged in private or commercial activity or business ventures. 22
Before Congress passed the FSIA in 1976, foreign states
sued in United States courts often requested the State Depart-
ment to suggest immunity to the court.23 United States courts
considering the immunity claims of foreign states routinely de-
ferred to the State Department's advice,2 4 reasoning that for-
eign relations are chiefly the province of the executive
branch.25 A series of Supreme Court cases in the first half of
the twentieth century dictated that courts should follow such
suggestions without independent judicial inquiry.26 Recogniz-
ing that courts deferred to State Department recommendations,
foreign nations seeking immunity often placed diplomatic pres-
sure on the executive branch.2 7 Foreign state defendants did
through any procedure for dispute settlement to which the two states have
agreed. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 555. Dispute settlement procedures include
bilateral commissions, conciliation and mediation procedures, arbitration, and
judicial settlement. Id. at 556. International law also permits the injured state
to use unilateral measures such as suspension of diplomatic relations or bilat-
eral aid, to pressure the offending state to make compensation. See id. at 541-
42.
Although individuals, since at least the nineteenth century, were not seen
as subjects of international law, an injury by one state to a national of another
constituted an offense to the state of the injured individual's nationality. 1 RE-
STATEMENT (REvISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 445 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). Because the liability in international law
for the offense runs from the responsible state to the state of the injured indi-
vidual's nationality, only that state may assert the claim on the international
level. See HENKIN, supra note 10, at 1042.
22. See T. GIUTTARI, supra note 11, at 9. The rationale for restricting sov-
ereign immunity in such cases is to avoid denying legal remedies to private
parties injured in the course of their trade. See id. at 67. When a state engages
in competition with private entities, such competition is unfair if the state is
not answerable in the courts of the state in which the business is transacted.
Id. at 77.
23. See, e.g., Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581 (1943).
24. See T. GIUTTARI, supra note 11, at 14-15.
25. See J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6.2,
at 189-90 (3d ed. 1986); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3 (enumerating presi-
dent's foreign affairs powers).
26. See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S.
at 587; Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303
U.S. 68, 74 (1938); Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1921).
27. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
Commentators criticized the pattern of State Department determinations of
immunity claims as being governed by political expediency without regard for
consistency. See, e.g., Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses:
Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1, 11 (1976);
see also Note, supra note 12, at 183 (maintaining that State Department lacks
adjudicative machinery necessary for consistent determinations and is suscep-
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not always seek State Department intervention, however, and
were free to assert the defense of sovereign immunity directly
before the court.28 In such cases courts regularly decided immu-
nity issues without asking the State Department for advice.29
Thus, sovereign immunity determinations were not only some-
times the result of diplomatic pressure, but also were made in
two branches of the government. 30 Due to such influences, the
mechanisms for deciding immunity claims did not always
achieve results comporting with the restrictive theory of
immunity.31
To eliminate the unpredictability and inconsistency inher-
ent in these methods of decision, Congress passed the FSIA in
1976,32 codifying the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.33
The FSIA transfers determinations of sovereign immunity from
the executive to the judicial branch.3 The Act also establishes
uniform procedures for litigation against foreign states, their
agencies, and instrumentalities.35 Congress intended the FSIA
to create a comprehensive and exclusive federal framework for
tible to foreign political pressure). The State Department decided immunity
claims on a case-by-case basis and rarely gave reasons for its decisions. See,
e.g., Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F. 2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1974).
28. See Note, Act of State and Sovereign Immunities Doctrines: The Need
to Establish Congruity, 17 U.S.F. L. REv. 91, 95 (1982).
29. Courts determining issues of immunity without the State Depart-
ment's advice usually did so with reference to previous State Department deci-
sions. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. Because of the State Department's
routine failure to give explicit reasons for recommending a grant or denial of
immunity, courts had little guidance on which to base immunity decisions ab-
sent a State Department recommendation. See Note, Jurisdiction Over For-
eign Governments: A Comprehensive Review of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119, 123-24 (1986) (observing that
State Department's unpredictable process of determining sovereign immunity
hindered development of uniformity in case law).
30. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
31. See id. at 487.
32. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982)).
33. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEWs 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT];
see also Annotation, Exceptions to Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign States
and Their Property Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 59
A.L.R. FED. 99, 103-04 (1982) (discussing purposes of FSIA).
34. See Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 302, 304-05
(1986). The drafters of the FSIA intended this transfer to depoliticize sover-
eign immunity cases. Id.
35. See Annotation, supra note 33, at 103-04; HOUSE REPORT, supra note
33, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6606.
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litigation against foreign states, 36 extending from service of pro-
cess to execution of judgment37
The general rule of the FSIA provides that a foreign state
is immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts.38 The
Act lists limited exceptions, however, primarily related to com-
mercial or private activity.3 9 Specifically, these exceptions ap-
ply to commercial activity of the foreign state,40 noncommercial
torts occurring in the United States,1 maritime claims in rem
36. Section 1603 of the FSIA defines foreign state:
For purposes of this chapter-
(a) A "foreign state" ... includes a political subdivision of a for-
eign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined
in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any
entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the
laws of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1982).
37. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmmN. NEWS at 6606; Feldman, supra note 34, at 305. Section 1602 declares
the FSIA's exclusive role: "Claims of foreign states to immunity should
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in con-
formity with the principles set forth in this chapter." 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
The FSIA's comprehensive and exclusive intent also is apparent in its leg-
islative history:
[T]he "Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976" sets forth the sole
and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign
immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in
the United States. It is intended to preempt any other State or Fed-
eral law (excluding applicable international agreements) for according
immunity to foreign sovereigns, their political subdivisions, their
agencies, and their instrumentalities.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 6610. The Supreme Court also has recognized the comprehen-
siveness of the FSIA. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 488 (1983).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. This section states:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of
this chapter.
Id.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605; Feldman, supra note 34, at 305-06.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
41. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
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arising out of commercial activity,42 actions involving real prop-
erty and inheritances in the United States,43 actions in which
the foreign state waives its immunity," and actions involving a
foreign state's unlawful expropriation of property.45 Using
these exceptions private plaintiffs have sued foreign states in
federal courts46  without provoking serious diplomatic
repercussions. 47
B. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
In contrast to the relative recency of the FSIA's enactment,
the Alien Tort Statute" has existed for almost two hundred
years.4 9 The statute provides in full that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
42. Id. § 1605(b).
43. Id. § 1605(a)(4).
44. Id. § 1605(a)(1).
45. Id. § 1605(a)(3); Feldman, supra note 34, at 305-06.
46. E.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
47. See Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity: A
Conflicts Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1440, 1443 (1983) (noting that vast ma-
jority of FSIA cases, those involving breach of contract and commercial activi-
ties within United States, have raised no significant foreign relations issues).
Some commentators predicted problems in judicial application of the
FSIA. See, e.g., Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits of Judicial Control-The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 429, 430, 451
(1977) (suggesting that FSIA would present courts with choice of law dilem-
mas). One court has characterized the FSIA as a "statutory labyrinth that,
owing to the numerous interpretive questions engendered by its bizarre struc-
ture and its many deliberately vague provisions, has during its brief lifetime
been a financial boon for the private bar but a constant bane of the federal
judiciary." Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105 (S.D.N.Y.
1982). One of the FSIA's drafters, however, has stated that courts applying the
FSIA in its first ten years of existence generally have done so in accordance
with the drafters' intent. See Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the
United States Courts 1976-1986, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 24 (1986). An
American Bar Association study concluded that the FSIA has been successful
in serving its major purposes-the transfer of decision making from the execu-
tive to the judiciary and the codification of the restrictive theory of immu-
nity-but also noted that problems have arisen that require further
congressional action. Id. at 35. For a review of cases brought under the FSIA's
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity, see Annotation, supra note 33, at
108-45.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
49. The statute originally formed part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
established the federal court system of the United States. See Randall, Federal
Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort
Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 3 (1985); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). The Constitution empowered Congress to establish
1988]
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treaty of the United States."5 0
Even though the statute has rarely been invoked,5 1 its
broad and vague language has generated a variety of judicial in-
terpretations. 52 Courts attempting to construe its cryptic lan-
guage have been further hindered because no specific
legislative history of the Alien Tort Statute exists.53 As a re-
sult, the requirements for a cause of action or defense under
the statute remain areas of considerable uncertainty and
disagreement.
federal courts and to determine the scope of their jurisdiction. See U.S. CONsr.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
Judge Friendly described the Alien Tort Statute as "a kind of legal Lo-
hengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act... no one
seems to know whence it came." IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1975).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
51. See Randall, supra note 49, at 4 n.15, 5 n.17. According to research
done by Professor Kenneth C. Randall of the University of Alabama Law
School, plaintiffs invoked the Alien Tort Statute in only 21 cases in the first
191 years of the statute's existence. See id. at 4 n.15.
52. See Randall, supra note 49, at 31 (courts have expressed confusion and
some disagreement over construction of statute). Compare Dreyfus v. Von
Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976) (law of nations does not vest plaintiff with
individual legal rights), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) with Abdul-Rahman
Omar Adra: v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864 (D. Md. 1961) (individual may violate
law of nations).
53. The House debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789 do not mention the
Alien Tort Statute, while the Senate debates were not recorded. Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)
(citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-833 (J. Gales ed. 1789)), cert denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985).
Professor Randall has attempted to reconstruct a legislative history of the
statute, relying on the Federalist Papers and contemporary events. See Ran-
dall, supra note 49, at 11-31. He theorizes that the statute covers alien suits for
a "tort only" because of fears that British creditors would flood United States
courts with actions brought under the law of merchants to recover on debts.
See id. at 28-31. The statute might cover only torts in violation of the law of
nations because of an incident that occurred in Pennsylvania in 1784 involving
an assault and battery of the French Consul General. Although attacks on
diplomats violated the law of nations, the Continental Congress had no power
to force the State of Pennsylvania to extradite the assailant, a French national,
to France. See id. at 24-28. For a similar analysis, see Casto, The Federal
Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law
of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 488-98 (1986). Commentators agree that the
Alien Tort Statute formed part of an effort by the Judiciary Act's drafters to
keep control of foreign relations in the hands of the federal government. Com-
pare Randall, supra note 49, at 21 (drafters of Judiciary Act considered state
tribunals to be parochial in nature and more likely to deny justice to alien)
with Note, supra note 7, at 115 (congressional provision of federal forum for
alien claimants was based on Confederation experience illustrating danger of
permitting one state to draw the others into foreign entanglement or war).
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The statute's broad language seems to permit any alien to
bring an action.5 The statute is silent with respect to the class
of defendants, however, and plaintiffs have attempted to invoke
the statute's jurisdiction over individuals,55 corporations,56 and
sovereign states.5 7 Other phrases in the statutory language
have proven equally perplexing. Courts have had difficulty de-
ciding what constitutes a "violation of the law of nations,"5 8 and
courts have not agreed on the meaning of "tort only."5 9 More-
over, decisions conflict as to whether the Alien Tort Statute
merely provides aliens with a forum or whether it also creates
a cause of action.6
0
Due in part to the statute's ambiguity, courts generally
have denied jurisdiction. Before 1980 courts sustained jurisdic-
tion under the Alien Tort Statute in only two of the few cases
54. Historical evidence suggests that the legislation was specifically in-
tended to protect foreign ambassador plaintiffs. See Casto, supra note 53, at
499; Randall, supra note 49, at 24-28.
55. See Cohen v. Hartman, 490 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1980), affl'd, 634
F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
56. See 11T v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
57. See Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 1168, 1171
(D.D.C. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Under the traditional positivist view of international law, only states could
violate international law. See Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort
Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 473, 497 (1986).
Individuals, however, were capable of violating the law of nations in 1789. See
Note, supra note 18, at 129-30. The state-oriented concept of international law
did not become predominant until the nineteenth century. See id. at 130-31.
58. One court attempting to apply the law of nations under the Alien Tort
Statute defined "violation of the law of nations" as "inter alia, at least a viola-
tion by one or more individuals of those standards, rules or customs
(a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a
foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in
dealings inter se." Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 295-
97 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
59. Some courts have concluded that this element of the statute can be
satisfied only by an "international tort." See Trans-Continental Inv. Corp.,
S.A. v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp. 565, 569-70 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
Others have interpreted the statute to require a tort under United States mu-
nicipal law accompanied by a violation of the law of nations or a treaty. See
Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 862-65 (D. Md. 1961).
60. Compare Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding
that statute did not create cause of action for plaintiff seeking recovery under
treaty, but merely granted court jurisdiction to determine whether plaintiff
had pleaded cause of action), cert denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) with Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776-82 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., con-
curring) (asserting that statute provides cause of action and judicial forum for
plaintiff trying to establish violation of law of nations), cert denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985).
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in which the statute was invoked. 61 Jurisdiction was found
proper in a 1961 child custody dispute62 and in a 1795 restitu-
tion action involving property seized from a Spanish warship. 63
The Second Circuit raised the statute from obscurity in
1980, applying it to find jurisdiction over an alien's human
rights claim. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,64 two Paraguayans sued
a former Paraguayan police chief living in the United States for
the wrongful death by torture of a member of their family.65
The court reasoned that torture by a government official vio-
lates the law of nations, giving rise to a grant of jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Statute.66 The case raised no sovereign
immunity issues, because the Filartigas did not name Paraguay
as a defendant and Pena-Irala did not claim immunity.67
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the District of Columbia
Circuit has refused to apply the Alien Tort Statute to an inter-
61. See Randall, supra note 49, at 5.
62. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 862-65 (D. Md.
1961) (court sustained jurisdiction over child custody action by Lebanese na-
tional against former wife, finding that wife's unlawful removal of child from
father's custody was a tort, while falsification of wife's passport to conceal
child's nationality violated law of nations).
63. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (court sus-
tained jurisdiction over action for restitution of neutral property seized from
Spanish warship).
64. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For detailed analyses of Filartiga and its
potential impact, see Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over Inter-
national Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981); Sohn, Torture as a Violation of the
Law of Nations, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307 (1981); Comment, Interna-
tional Law and Human Rights-Alien Tort Claims Under 28 U.S.C § 1350: Fi-
lartiga v. Pena-Irala, 66 MINN. L. REV. 357 (1982).
65. Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Plaintiff Dr. Joel Filartiga had
opposed Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner. Id. at 878. Filartiga and
his daughter alleged that defendant Pena-Irala, as Inspector General of Police
in Asuncion, had kidnapped, tortured, and killed Filartiga's 17-year-old son in
retaliation for Filartiga's political activities. Id. Filartiga's daughter, in the
United States on a visitor's visa, sued Pena-Irala in the Eastern District of
New York upon learning of his presence in Brooklyn, where he was personally
served with process. Id. at 878-79.
Human rights proponents applauded the Filartiga decision as giving the
federal courts a new role in the enforcement of international human rights.
See, e.g., Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Fi-
lartiga v. Pena-Irala, 33 STAN. L. REV. 353, 368 (1981). See generally Note, En-
forcement of International Human Rights in the Federal Courts After
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 67 VA. L. REv. 1379 (1981) (suggesting that federal
courts have obligation to hear claims of human rights violations when Con-
gress has provided jurisdiction). For a discussion of the development of
human rights in international law, see Note, supra note 18, at 129-32.
66. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887.
67. See Note, supra note 18, at 144 n.101.
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national human rights claim.68 In other types of claims brought
under the statute, most courts since Filartiga have denied
jurisdiction.6 9
Jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute over a foreign
68. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). This action arose out of an at-
tack by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on an Israeli civilian bus.
Id. at 776. Plaintiffs, individuals who had survived the attack and relatives of
those killed, had asserted jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. Original
defendants included the PLO, the Libyan Arab Republic, the Palestine Infor-
mation Office, the National Association of Arab Americans, and the Palestine
Congress of North America. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp.
542, 544-45 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd per cur/am, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). The district court stated that the FSIA barred
the claim against Libya. See id. at 549 & n.3. For analyses of Tel-Oren, see
-D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's Concept of the Law
of Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985); Comment, Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort Claims Act, 70
MINN. L. REV. 211 (1985); Recent Development, Separation of Powers and Ad-
judication of Human Rights Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 60
WASH. L. REv. 697 (1985).
Although the circuit court panel unanimously denied jurisdiction, the
judges differed markedly in their reasoning in three separate opinions. The
most controversial of the three concurrences in Tel-Oren was the opinion of
Judge Bork. He voted to affirm dismissal because of concern over the courts'
interfering with the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches. 726
F.2d at 799 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork stated that the Alien Tort Stat-
ute should be construed as providing jurisdiction only when a modern statute,
treaty, or executive agreement grants a cause of action, or when an alien's
claim arises out of one of the three international crimes recognized at the time
the Alien Tort Statute was enacted. Id. at 813-16. Judge Bork cited Black-
stone to demonstrate that only piracy, violation of safe conducts, and infringe-
ments of the rights of ambassadors violated the law of nations in 1789. See id.
at 813. Judge Bork also seemed concerned that a more expansive reading of
the Alien Tort Statute would flood United States courts with suits by and
against aliens. See id. at 812, 821. For a succinct summary and analysis of the
three concurrences in Tel-Oren, see Weissbrodt, Ethical Problems of an Inter-
national Human Rights Law Practice, 1985 MCH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUDIES
217, 245-47 & nn. 117-18.
69. See Randall, supra note 49, at 5-7 & n.19 and authorities cited therein.
The decisions continue to evidence inconsistent and confused approaches to ju-
risdiction under the statute. Id. at 7. Compare Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691,
692 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that jurisdiction under Alien Tort Statute applies
only to "shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized principles of
international law") and Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 215
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that to violate law of nations defendant's conduct
must be "so universally abhorred" that its prohibition commands the "'gen-
eral assent of civilized nations,'" (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
881 (1980))) with Trans-Continental Inv. Corp., S.A. v. Bank of the Common-
wealth, 500 F. Supp. 565, 570 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (stating that "controversy must
implicate a treaty or that body of rules and custom governing relations be-
tween states inter se or between a state and foreign citizens or subjects" for
Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction to apply).
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sovereign was first exercised in 1985 in Von Dardel v. USSR.70
In Von Dardel the plaintiffs sued the Soviet Union for the
arrest and subsequent disappearance of Swedish diplomat
Raoul Wallenberg in Hungary in early 1945.71 The court held
that the FSIA did not preclude jurisdiction over the Soviet
Union.72 The court first found that to allow immunity under
the FSIA for an offense against a diplomat would interfere
with United States obligations under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations73 and the 1973 Convention on Internation-
ally Protected Persons.74 As the court noted, the FSIA grants
immunity subject to international agreements to which the
United States was a party at the time of its enactment. 75 The
court then determined that the Soviet Union had impliedly
waived its FSIA immunity by ratifying certain human rights
treaties.76 After concluding that the FSIA granted no immu-
nity, the court considered whether jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute was proper.77 According to the court the Alien
Tort Statute applied because interfering with a diplomat vio-
lated both contemporary international law and the law of na-
tions at the time the statute was enacted.78
70. 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985). In addition to the district court in
Amerada Hess, two other courts have rejected the argument that the Alien
Tort Statute creates an implied exception to the FSIA. See In re Korean Air
Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, Misc. No. 83-0345, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. Aug. 1,
1985) (stating that to find that Alien Tort Statute gives cause of action when
FSIA forbids it would make FSIA a nullity); Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV
82-1772-RMT (MCx), slip op. at 2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (order for recon-
sideration) (concluding that Alien Tort Statute's silence on issue of sovereign
immunity could not be read as implying exemption from sovereign immunity
for claims arising under the statute), dismissed, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (CmCx)
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985).
71. 623 F. Supp. at 249.
72. Id. at 254-56.
73. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, Apr. 4, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
74. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against In-
ternationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973,
28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
75. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254-55; 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982). The court
found that a grant of immunity to the Soviet Union under the FSIA would
thwart the treaties' operation. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 255.
76. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 255-56; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982).
77. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 256.
78. See id. at 256-59. The court found jurisdiction under the reasoning of
all three concurrences in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). For a discussion of
Tel-Oren, see supra note 68.
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II. THE PREEMPTIVE NATURE OF THE FSIA
A. THE DECISION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT IN AMERADA HESS
The Amerada Hess court was the first appellate panel to
construe the Alien Tort Statute as providing a basis for jurisdic-
tion over foreign states. The majority reasoned that the Alien
Tort Statute would apply only if Argentina's attack on a neu-
tral commercial vessel violated international law.79 Citing trea-
ties, case law, and academic literature, the court concluded that
an attack on a neutral ship in international waters, without
cause for suspicion or investigation, violates international law.80
Thus, the attack was within the ambit of the statute.s
The court then analyzed the jurisdictional requirements of
the Alien Tort Statute.8 2 Because Amerada Hess, a foreign cor-
poration, alleged a tort committed in violation of international
law, the court found that the Alien Tort Statute granted juris-
diction to hear the claim.83 According to the court, interna-
tional law did not prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Statute.84 Furthermore, the court con-
cluded that states are not immune from suit for their violations
of international law.85 Consequently, Argentina enjoyed no im-
munity from jurisdiction.8 6
Recognizing that none of the FSIA exceptions to immunity
applied, the court next considered whether the FSIA is the ex-
clusive means by which United States courts may exercise ju-
risdiction over a foreign sovereign.8 7 The court acknowledged
79. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421,
423-24 (2d Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
80. Id. at 424.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 424-26.
83. Id. at 426.
84. See id. at 425-26.
85. Id. at 425. The court cited two writers in the field of human rights as
authority for this assessment of the modern rule of foreign sovereign immu-
nity in international law. Id. (citing Bazyler, Litigating the International Law
of Human Rights: A "How To" Approach, 7 WrrrIER L. REV. 713, 733-34
(1985); Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA
and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 221-32 (1983)).
86. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 426.
87. Argentina contended that the FSIA precluded resort to the Alien Tort
Statute as a basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 426. The United States Department of
State also argued this position as amicus curiae. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 13-18, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (No. 86-7602), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466
(1988). The district court adopted this rationale in dismissing Amerada Hess's
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that the FSIA's legislative history stated that the statute set
forth the sole and exclusive standards for resolving sovereign
immunity questions.88 The majority noted, however, that Con-
gress had focused solely on commercial concerns in enacting
the FSIA. The statute's legislative history did not address ac-
tions arising out of violations of international law.89 Because
Congress expressed no clear intent to contradict the immunity
rules of international law and had not repealed the Alien Tort
Statute, the court reasoned that the FSIA did not preempt the
Alien Tort Statute's jurisdictional grant.90 The Second Circuit
therefore held that an alien may sue a foreign sovereign under
the Alien Tort Statute when that sovereign's violation of inter-
national law gives rise to a tort claim, even though the FSIA
would bar the suit.91
complaint. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F.
Supp. 73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
88. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 426; see also supra note 37 (discussing ex-
clusive, comprehensive, and preemptive intent of FSIA).
89. See Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 426-27. The court reviewed the policies
underlying the FSIA as indicated in the statute's legislative history. See id.
The court found that Congress's goal of codifying the restrictive doctrine of
sovereign immunity limited the FSIA's scope to commercial situations. See id.
at 427.
90. Id. Additionally, the court found that Argentina's contacts with the
United States satisfied the due process requirements for personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 428. A United States court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a de-
fendant complies with the fifth amendment requirement of due process if the
defendant's contacts with the forum state are such that maintenance of the ac-
tion does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In the case of a
foreign defendant, the court must examine the extent to which defendants
availed themselves of the privileges of American law, the extent to which liti-
gation in the United States would be foreseeable to them, the inconvenience to
defendants of litigating in the United States, and the countervailing interest of
the United States in hearing the suit. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 297 (1980).
The court based its finding of sufficient contacts with the United States on
Argentina's having been specifically notified by the United States that the
tanker would be passing through the South Atlantic on neutral business on
the date it was attacked. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 428. The court reasoned
that Argentina thus was on notice that it might be sued in the United States.
Id.
91. See Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 428-29. Consequently, the majority re-
manded the case to the district court for trial on the merits. Acknowledging
that other courts have decided the question differently, the court noted the
difficulty of construing the effect of the two statutes. Id. at 429 & n.2. In a
dissenting opinion, Judge Kearse agreed with those courts that have concluded
that the FSIA provides the sole and exclusive basis on which a United States
court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. See id. at 429-31.
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B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONFUSION
OVER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The majority decision in Amerada Hess added a new fac-
tor-the international law of sovereign immunity-to the ex-
isting judicial confusion 92 over the meaning and application of
the Alien Tort Statute. The court's use of the statute as a juris-
dictional basis is inappropriate. The court misinterpreted the
FSIA and erroneously relied on international law.
1. The Court's Misinterpretation of the FSIA
The Amerada Hess majority asserted that Congress in the
FSIA adopted a theory of immunity the focus of which is lim-
ited to commercial situations.9 3 As a result the court concluded
that the FSIA did not deny jurisdiction over a foreign govern-
ment's violation of international law.94 The court's analysis dis-
misses clear statements of congressional intent in both the
statute and its legislative history as inapplicable because of the
commercial focus of the FSIA.95 In fact, the plain language of
the FSIA reveals that Congress intended the statute to provide
the sole means by which United States courts are to decide for-
eign sovereign immunity claims. 96 The Act states that "a for-
eign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States and of the States except as provided in...
this chapter."97 The FSIA's legislative history also underscores
the mandatory and exclusive nature of the statute's provi-
sions.98 According to the House Report, the Act provides the
Judge Kearse would have affirmed the district court's reasoning. Id. at 431.
The majority opinion expressed relief in the knowledge that, if its decision
were erroneous, Congress could correct it through statutory amendment. Id.
at 429. The court also emphasized that the class of actions that are recognized
as international law violations, as distinguished from mere torts, is quite small.
Id.
92. See generally Randall, supra note 49, at 7-10 (discussing recently in-
creased judicial confusion and disagreement over Alien Tort Statute).
93. 830 F.2d at 426-27.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 427; 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982) (findings and declaration of pur-
pose); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 14, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 6613 ("[Ihe sovereign immunity of foreign states should be
'restricted' to cases involving acts of a foreign state which are sovereign or gov-
ernmental in nature, as opposed to acts which are either commercial in nature
or those which private persons normally perform.").
96. See supra note 37 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1602).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
98. See supra note 37 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 12, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & A.DmN. NEWS at 6610).
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"sole and exclusive standards" to be used in resolving sovereign
immunity questions and preempts all other laws except inter-
national agreements.99 Furthermore, the legislative history of
the Act indicates that only international agreements which ex-
pressly conflict with the FSIA on the issue of sovereign immu-
nity are given priority.100
The general rule intended by the drafters of the FSIA is
that foreign states retain immunity for their official acts.10 1 The
exceptions listed in the FSIA relate to commercial or private
activities, 0 2 but this does not support the court's conclusion
that the Act has a commercial focus. The exceptions simply
grew out of Congress's desire to codify the restrictive doctrine
of immunity. 0 3 Under this doctrine jurisdiction is appropriate
only over a state's commercial or private acts. It was unneces-
sary for the FSIA's drafters to explicitly state that foreign na-
tions retain immunity for their official acts. Such acts are
implicitly within the statute's blanket grant of immunity1 4
Much of the FSIA's language is devoted to foreign states' com-
mercial activities, but merely because the drafters needed more
words to enumerate the exceptions to immunity than to enunci-
ate the general rule. 0 5 The emphasis on commercial activity in
the FSIA's exceptions does not render the statute any less com-
prehensive than its legislative history indicates. The FSIA is
not limited to commercial situations but applies as well to offi-
cial acts.
In justifying its departure from the FSIA exceptions to sov-
99. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6610.
100. Under the FSIA a foreign sovereign may expressly or impliedly waive
its immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). As the legislative history makes plain, an
implied waiver should be found in cases "where a foreign state has agreed to
arbitration in another country or where a foreign state has agreed that the law
of a particular country should govern a contract." HOUSE REPORT, supra note
33, at 18, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6617. Thus, a
foreign state should not be found to have waived its immunity by signing other
types of international agreements, such as the agreements relied on in Von
Dardel. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. The FSIA controls in-
ternational agreements that are silent as to the question of immunity. See 28
U.S.C. § 1604.
101. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6605.
102. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
103. For a discussion of the restrictive theory of immunity, see supra notes
21-22 and accompanying text.
104. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
105. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity)
with 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (blanket grant of immunity to foreign states).
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ereign immunity, the Amerada Hess court also emphasized the
FSIA's failure to focus on violations of international law.106 The
majority found nothing in the FSIA's legislative history to indi-
cate that the statute bars suits against a foreign state for viola-
tions of international law.107 The majority erred, however, in
concluding that Congress did not consider violations of interna-
tional law when it enacted the FSIA. The FSIA's drafters con-
sidered and included one violation of international law in the
statute's exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. Section
1605(a)(3) of the FSIA denies immunity in cases in which prop-
erty rights are taken in violation of international law.108 As the
FSIA's legislative history indicates, the nationalization of prop-
erty without prompt, adequate, and effective compensation is
such a taking.10 9 Thus, the FSIA denies immunity to a foreign
state for violations of international law involving arbitrary or
uncompensated expropriations of property.
Surprisingly, the FSIA's "silence" on violations of interna-
tional law disturbed the Amerada Hess court more than the
Alien Tort Statute's silence regarding foreign sovereigns. The
court reasoned that if Congress had intended the FSIA to bar
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign for a violation of interna-
tional law, Congress either would have stated this intent or
would have repealed the Alien Tort Statute.110 This view, how-
ever, ignores the extremely infrequent use of the Alien Tort
Statute before Filartiga.1 ' At the time Congress enacted the
FSIA, no plaintiff in a United States court had invoked the
Alien Tort Statute to assert jurisdiction over a foreign sover-
eign.-1  As a result the FSIA's drafters had no reason to antici-
pate, much less to address, a potential conflict between the
FSIA and the Alien Tort Statute. Moreover, the statute's legis-
lative history plainly indicates the preemptive intent of the
106. See 830 F.2d at 427.
107. Id.
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
109. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 19-20, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6618.
110. See Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 427.
111. For a discussion of the scarcity of cases construing the Alien Tort Stat-
ute before Filartiga, see supra note 51 and accompanying text. For a descrip-
tion of the decision in Filartiga, see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
112. See Randall, supra note 49, at 4 n.15. Randall's research shows only 21
cases in which the Alien Tort Statute was invoked before Filartiga. See id.
The first of these to name a sovereign state as defendant is Canadian Transp.
Co. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 1168 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirming dismissal of Alien Tort Statute
claim).
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FSIA's drafters. 113
Similarly, the failure of Congress to repeal the Alien Tort
Statute does not suggest that Congress intended that statute to
provide an alternative means by which United States courts
may exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. Because the
Alien Tort Statute mentions neither foreign sovereigns nor de-
fendants of any kind, the statute can be construed not to con-
flict with the FSIA's preemptive intent.114 Rules of statutory
construction, which provide that statutes should be construed
harmoniously whenever possible, support such an interpreta-
tion.115 The FSIA by its terms creates a class of defendants:
foreign states acting in commercial or private undertakings or
allegedly committing torts within the United States. Con-
versely, the Alien Tort Statute creates a class of plaintiffs:
aliens suing for torts that violate the law of nations." 6
In addition to codifying restrictive sovereign immunity in
the FSIA, Congress sought to transfer determinations of immu-
nity claims from the State Department to the courts and to es-
tablish uniform procedures for litigation against foreign
states. 1 7 Congress intended foreign sovereign immunity deter-
minations to be made according to uniform standards of deci-
113. The FSIA "is intended to preempt any other State or Federal law...
for according immunity to foreign sovereigns." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33,
at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6610 (emphasis added).
114. Plaintiffs in Amerada Hess argued that a cause of action against a for-
eign sovereign which the Alien Tort Statute provided must survive the FSIA,
because repeal by implication is disfavored. 638 F. Supp. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d. 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
The district court responded: "[Tihe FSIA does not repeal the Alien Tort Act
because it narrows the class of defendants. It does the same to many of the
jurisdictional statutes in the United States Code.... Thus, it is irrelevant that
repeal by implication is disfavored. The FSIA effects no repeal." Id
115. See Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1331 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating prop-
osition that "'when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary,
to regard each as effective'" (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551
(1974))), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 147 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Department of
Health and Human Servs., 723 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[S]tatutory pro-
visions enacted at different times should be read as harmoniously as possible,
so that each is given effect and the provisions do not conflict."); District of Co-
lumbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Airis, 275 F. Supp. 533, 538 (D.D.C. 1967)
(whenever possible, apparent conflict between two statutes should be resolved
so as to give effect to each).
116. Under the conventional positivist view, however, only states could vio-
late international law. Randall, supra note 57, at 497. For a discussion of who
may be a defendant under the Alien Tort Statute, see supra notes 55-57 and
accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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sion, because disparate treatment of cases involving foreign
governments may produce adverse foreign policy conse-
quences.118 The Amerada Hess court's exercise of jurisdiction
over Argentina under the Alien Tort Statute frustrates the
achievement of uniformity in sovereign immunity determina-
tions. After Amerada Hess a court may exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign state to hear a suit that the FSIA bars. In deter-
mining the state's immunity claim, that court necessarily will
have considered factors different from those considered in the
FSIA provisions. Furthermore, it may be easier for alien plain-
tiffs to assert jurisdiction unider the Alien Tort Statute than
under the FSIA. The FSIA has clear exceptions to immunity
and well-developed case law, while much confusion surrounds
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. Uncertainty about
which law to apply could lead to conflicting determinations of
immunity questions.119 Such a result would exacerbate the lack
of decisional uniformity and could perpetuate the precise
problems Congress intended to eliminate when it enacted the
FSIA. 2 0
The Amerada Hess court not only ignores congressional in-
tent, but also deviates from the predominant interpretation ap-
118. See HOuSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS at 6611.
119. One way in which courts may arrive at conflicting results under the
Alien Tort Statute is in determining whether they have personal jurisdiction
over a foreign state. The Amerada Hess court's analysis of the personal juris-
diction question was less than coherent. The court found that the plaintiffs'
allegations were sufficiently related to the United States to put Argentina on
notice that it might be sued in this country. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 428.
The court's reasoning, however, overlooks the effect of the FSIA. Argentina
had no reason to anticipate being sued in the United States over an act com-
mitted by its armed forces, because the FSIA provides jurisdiction only over
foreign governments' commercial or private acts. See supra notes 39-45 and ac-
companying text. Similarly, that the tanker had been engaged in United
States trade under a contract to be paid in the United States establishes only
that contacts existed between the plaintiffs and the forum. Amerada Hess,
830 F.2d at 428. The court gave only cursory analysis to the remaining ele-
ments of the test for sufficient minimum contacts for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. See id.; supra note 90 (quoting elements
of test for sufficient contacts required for constitutional exercise of personal
jurisdiction).
120. Indeed, this result already has occurred at the federal district court
level. See supra note 70 and authorities cited therein. Compare In re Korean
Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, Misc. No. 83-0345 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1985)
(holding that FSIA precluded court's exercise of jurisdiction over USSR under
Alien Tort Statute) with Von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985)
(alternatively holding that Alien Tort Statute provided basis for jurisdiction to
enter default judgment against USSR).
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plied by other courts to the FSIA. The Amerada Hess majority
is the first appellate panel to hold that courts may exercise ju-
risdiction over foreign sovereigns under a statute other than
the FSIA. The only other court to exercise jurisdiction over a
foreign state under the Alien Tort Statute did so by finding
that the state had impliedly waived its immunity by ratifying
certain human rights treaties.12' Even if this were a valid the-
ory,1 22 no such argument was raised in Amerada Hess. Virtu-
ally all other United States courts interpreting the FSIA have
assumed that it is the exclusive source of jurisdiction over for-
eign sovereigns,1 23 even if other jurisdictional statutes also ap-
pear to apply.124 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the FSIA provides the exclusive means for
determining claims of sovereign immunity. 2 5 In light of these
121. See Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 256, 259 (holding jurisdiction existed
under FSIA waiver exception and Alien Tort Statute and entering default
judgment against USSR for imprisonment and possible death of Swedish diplo-
mat Raoul Wallenberg in action brought by Wallenberg's relatives). Until
Amerada Hess, Von Dardel stood alone in finding that the FSIA exceptions to
immunity are not the sole means by which courts of the United States can ob-
tain jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. For a discussion of Von Dardel, see
supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
122. The theory that a state's ratification of human rights agreements con-
stitutes a waiver of immunity within the meaning of the FSIA's waiver excep-
tion was explicitly rejected in Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370, 378 (7th Cir.
1985) (per curiam). Stating that the FSIA's implicit waiver clause should be
narrowly construed, the Frolova court saw no basis in the vague, general lan-
guage of the United Nations Charter for finding a waiver. Id. at 377-78. Addi-
tionally, the court found no reason to conclude that nations that ratified the
Charter anticipated when signing it that American courts would be the means
by which the Charter's provisions would be enforced. Id. at 378.
123. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp.
73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108 S.
Ct. 1466 (1988). All other Circuit Courts of Appeal that have considered the
FSIA in relation to other jurisdictional statutes have concluded that the FSIA
is the sole source of jurisdiction over foreign states. See McKeel v. Islamic Re-
public of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 586-87 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 880
(1985); Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1982);
Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Rex v. Com-
pania Pervana de Vapores, S.A. 660 F.2d 61, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 926 (1982); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 881 (4th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
124. See O'Connell Machinery Co. v. M.V. Americana, 734 F.2d 115, 117 (2d
Cir.) (holding liner owned by Italian government immune from prejudgment
attachment in admiralty under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d)), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1086
(1984); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639
F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir. 1981) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that they could re-
sort to diversity jurisdiction when suing entity owned by foreign government
to obtain jury trial).
125. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1982)
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judicial interpretations, Amerada Hess inappropriately adds an-
other exception to sovereign immunity to those in the FSIA.126
2. Misplaced Reliance on International Law
Although sovereign immunity exists in international
law,12 7 no theory of immunity permits a United States court to
exercise jurisdiction under the facts of Amerada Hess.2 8 The
court relied on secondary evidence, the writing of two law
("If one of the specified exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, a federal
district court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a); but if
the claim does not fall within one of the exceptions, federal courts lack
subject-matter jurisdiction.").
126. Human rights proponents and others who advocate a liberal interpre-
tation of the Alien Tort Statute have not questioned that the FSIA limits ju-
risdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 64,
at 106 & n.223 (under FSIA, state defendants absolutely immune from civil
suit under Alien Tort Statute; FSIA constitutes definitive pronouncement on
United States sovereign immunity law); Casto, supra note 53, at 472 & n.33
(sovereign immunity is potential limitation on Alien Tort Statute litigation);
Randall, supra note 57, at 509 (FSIA basically controls extent to which juris-
diction may be asserted over states; Alien Tort Statute is probably of greater
utility against nonstate actors); Note, supra note 18, at 169 (doctrine of sover-
eign immunity will, as a general rule, prevent sovereign states themselves
from being sued in United States courts). But see Paust, supra note 85, at 226
(domestic notions of sovereign immunity should not be applied in domestic
courts to thwart universal sanctions effort directed at international criminal
activity). Some human rights advocates have suggested that the FSIA be
amended to include a further exception to foreign sovereign immunity explic-
itly allowing United States courts to exercise jurisdiction over gross violations
of human rights by other states. See Gerstel & Segall, Conference Report:
Human Rights in American Courts, 1 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 137, 161
(1986).
127. See L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 15, at 266-67 (stating that courts of most
countries regard sovereign immunity as rule of international law).
128. Under the theory of universal jurisdiction, any nation may punish the
perpetrators of certain egregious violations of international law, regardless of
where the violations occur. See 1 RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF THE FoREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) (listing
piracy, slave trade, aircraft hijacking, genocide, war crimes, and possibly ter-
rorism as international crimes of universal concern that any state may define
and punish); HENKIN, supra note 10, at 856-59 (discussing principle of universal
jurisdiction). A United States court's exercise of jurisdiction over the perpe-
trator of such a crime, however, is subject to constitutional limitations. See 1
RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 423 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). United States courts may
hold criminal trials only when the accused is present. See id. at § 442 com-
ment c (iii). In a civil action, the court must have constitutionally sufficient
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 297 (1980). For a critique of the Amerada Hess
court's finding that it had personal jurisdiction over Argentina, see supra note
118.
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professors, to support its finding that international law denies
foreign states immunity for certain crimes.129 Only one of
these writers, however, suggested bringing actions directly
against foreign states.130 Even that writer seemed to limit juris-
diction over foreign sovereigns to suits for gross violations of
human rights and also stated objectives other than prevailing in
court.131 Furthermore, the court in Amerada Hess did not con-
sider primary evidence of international law, such as actual state
practice, which may negate secondary evidence. 32
The content of sovereign immunity doctrine derives
predominantly from such primary evidence.133 Some states ad-
here to the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity,'3 which
prevents national courts from exercising jurisdiction over any
act of a foreign sovereign, regardless of the act's nature.ES
Other countries, including the United States, apply the restric-
tive theory of immunity, 3 6 which allows courts to exercise ju-
risdiction only over a foreign state's commercial or private
acts. 37 Primary evidence therefore indicates that the court's
conclusion inaccurately assessed international law. Courts may
exercise jurisdiction only over the commercial or private acts of
another state. Argentina's attack on the tanker was neither a
commercial nor a private act, but an official act of the Argen-
tine government. Under both theories of sovereign immunity,
129. See supra note 85.
130. See Bazyler, supra note 85, at 714-15 (suggesting that suits for viola-
tions of human rights create greater awareness of existence of international
human rights). Paust, on the other hand, supports the notion that heads of
state and government officials must be denied immunity at both the domestic
and international levels for violations of international law. See Paust, supra
note 85, at 231-32.
131. See Bazyler, supra note 85, at 714-15.
132. See 1 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 103 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
133. Compare HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 14, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6613 (stating that although "the general con-
cept of sovereign immunity appears to be recognized in international law, its
specific content and application have generally been left to the courts of indi-
vidual nations") with G. BADR, supra note 17, at 9 (stating that municipal
courts took the lead in creating rules of state immunity while doctrinal opin-
ions and international conventions in the field were of subsequent growth).
134. See HENKIN, supra note 10, at 891.
135. For a description of the origins and content of the absolute theory of
sovereign immunity, see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
136. See G. BADR, supra note 17, at 104 (noting general trend in the direc-
tion of varying degrees of restrictive immunity).
137. For a discussion of the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immu-
nity, see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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international law precludes a United States court from exercis-
ing jurisdiction in such circumstances.
Even if international law permitted suits against foreign
sovereigns under these circumstances, a United States court
would not necessarily apply such a rule.138 The Amerada Hess
court's interpretation of international sovereign immunity law
conflicts with a federal statute, the FSIA.139 When a rule of in-
ternational law conflicts with a United States statute, United
States courts do not automatically apply international law.
Under the Constitution a federal statute may control a contrary
rule of customary international law.140 When such a conflict
exists, the Supremacy Clause makes the Constitution, United
States laws made in pursuance thereof, and treaties "the
Supreme Law of the Land."'14 1 Thus, Congress was free to pass
the FSIA even if the statute might conflict with the interna-
tional law of sovereign immunity.142 Having misinterpreted the
FSIA as applying only to commercial situations, the Amerada
Hess court failed to address the question of whether the statute
supersedes customary international law.143 The court did not
regard the FSIA as a comprehensive statement of United States
sovereign immunity law and thus failed to consider any conflict
between the statute and the court's interpretation of the inter-
national law of sovereign immunity.
Even if the rule of international law stood on an equal foot-
ing with the FSIA, it is unclear which would prevail in a
United States court. In an analogous situation, when a treaty
conflicts with a federal statute, the more recent law generally
is applied. 4 4 This later-in-time principle may also apply to a
138. For a discussion of the role of international law in the law of the
United States, see supra note 18 and authorities cited therein.
139. The FSIA provides an exception to a foreign state's immunity for only
one violation of international law: the expropriation of property without com-
pensation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A)(3) (1982).
140. See HENKIN, supra note 10, at 160.
141. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
142. Some authorities suggest that an act of Congress always controls a
contrary rule of customary international law before United States courts. See
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("For [the purpose of ascertain-
ing international law], where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and us-
ages of civilized nations .... ") (emphasis added).
143. See supra notes 93-113 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
court's misinterpretation of the FSIA.
144. The Supreme Court has stated:
When the [statute and treaty] relate to the same subject, the courts
will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if
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conflict between a rule of customary international law 45 and a
federal statute.1 46 Under this analysis the FSIA would prevail
over the rule of international law that according to the court
permitted jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, unless the
international rule had developed since the FSIA's enactment.
The Amerada Hess court assumed that the absence of FSIA
jurisdiction over Argentina's official act of bombing a Liberian
tanker mandated consideration of international law to find a
basis for exercising jurisdiction over Argentina. In doing so,
the court usurped a congressional function. Congress, not in-
ternational law, determines the scope of federal subject matter
jurisdiction in United States courts.' 47 Because Congress estab-
lished the FSIA as the exclusive means of resolving sovereign
immunity questions,' 48 the court's determination that Amerada
Hess's claim did not fall within one of the FSIA's exceptions
should have ended the inquiry.' 49 The court should have de-
nied jurisdiction.
A United States court's exercise of jurisdiction over a for-
eign government for an official' 5 0 act infringes upon the no-
that can be done without violating the language of either; but if the
two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, pro-
vided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-
executing.
Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). See generally J. NowAK, R. RO-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.8 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing con-
flicts between treaties and acts of Congress).
145. For a discussion of the difference between treaty law and customary
law, see supra note 9.
146. See 1 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 135 comment d (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) ("Whether a
rule of customary international law that developed after, and is inconsistent
with, an earlier statute ... should be given effect as the law of the United
States, has ... not been authoritatively determined.").
147. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 429 (2d Cir. 1987) (Kearse, J., dissenting)
(federal court subject matter jurisdiction exists only as far as Congress has be-
stowed it), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
148. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6610.
149. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983)
("If one of the specified exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, a federal
district court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction... but if the claim does
not fall within one of the exceptions, federal courts lack subject-matter
jurisdiction.").
150. Acts concerning a nation's armed forces are strictly political public
acts. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastacimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1964); see
also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, Misc. No. 83-0345, slip op.
at 14 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1985) ("The Court can conceive of no action which is
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tions of sovereign equality and independence that underlie the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.' 5 ' A lower court of a single
branch of the United States government should not pass judg-
ment on the legality of an act by the Argentine government.
Considerations of comity also counsel against such an exercise
of jurisdiction by United States courts.152 The courts of other
nations at most exercise jurisdiction over foreign governments'
commercial acts. 5 3 The Second Circuit's determination that
the international law of sovereign immunity allows a United
States court to exercise jurisdiction over an Argentine military
act could damage United States interests in the international
arena, interests that sovereign immunity evolved to protect.i5 4
III. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Under Amerada Hess an alien may invoke the Alien Tort
Statute to sue a foreign state in a United States court.. The de-
cision denied Argentina's claim of foreign sovereign immunity
in circumstances clearly not within the exceptions to immunity
codified in the FSIA. 5 5 Amerada Hess thus circumvented Con-
gress's intent that courts make immunity determinations exclu-
sively according to FSIA guidelines.. 56
The Alien Tort Statute's availability may lead plaintiffs
with claims against foreign governments to forego more appro-
priate avenues of remedy, such as diplomatic negotiation or res-
more classically political in nature or less open to judicial determination than
the decision of a government to exercise its military power.").
151. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing theories ad-
vanced to justify doctrine of sovereign immunity).
152. The United States presumably would resist judicial scrutiny of its own
official acts in the courts of another state. Indeed, the United States has exhib-
ited resistance to such scrutiny by an international tribunal. Following the In-
ternational Court of Justice's determination that it had jurisdiction over a
claim brought by Nicaragua against the United States, the United States termi-
nated its acceptance of the court's jurisdiction. See HENKIN, supra note 10, at
646; Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility Judgment of
Nov. 26).
153. See supra note 19-22 and accompanying text (discussing absolute and
restrictive theories of sovereign immunity and alternative means of interna-
tional dispute settlement).
154. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing origins of
sovereign immunity).
155. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (listing FSIA exceptions
to immunity).
156. See supra note 37 for a discussion of congressional intent in enacting
the FSIA.
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olution by an international tribunal. 57 Additionally, aliens
seeking redress under that statute for grievances against their
own governments could flood United States courts with suits
otherwise barred by the FSIA.158 To preclude further recourse
to the Alien Tort Statute as a means of evading the FSIA and
to avoid uncertainty in the application of these statutes, Con-
gress should amend 5 9 the Alien Tort Statute1 60 explicitly to
exclude actions against foreign sovereigns from its jurisdic-
tional grant.161
157. See supra note 21 (discussing remedies available under doctrine of
state responsibility for injury to aliens). The claim of the plaintiffs in Amer-
ada Hess probably would have been more appropriately resolved through the
United States Department of State. In fact, the State Department established
some precedent for handling the claim diplomatically when it issued a formal
demarche to the Argentine embassy protesting the attack on the Hercules.
See supra note 2.
158. The Filartiga decision created no similar possibility because that deci-
sion, limited to the facts of that case, required that personal jurisdiction be es-
tablished over the defendant torturer through service of process in the United
States. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (1980).
Fear of an increase in suits by aliens against aliens seemed to be one of
Judge Bork's reasons for the narrow reading he gave the Alien Tort Statute in
Tel-Oren. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812, 821 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Bork J., concurring), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). Judge Bork
probably did not even contemplate suits against foreign states, however, be-
cause he assumed that the FSIA barred such actions. See id. at 805 n.13. Com-
mentators viewed with skepticism Judge Bork's apprehensiveness over the
possibility that alien victims would flood United States courts with suits under
the Alien Tort Statute and pointed to sovereign immunity as a principle limit-
ing adjudication of Alien Tort Statute claims. See Note, Separation of Powers
and Adjudication of Human Rights Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
60 WASH. L. REV. 697, 716-17 (1985) (noting that if FSIA applies to Alien Tort
Statute claims, only those cases with claims arising from torts occurring in
United States would escape bar of sovereign immunity). Under the reasoning
of Amerada Hess, however, no such limiting principle remains.
The Amerada Hess court discounted the likelihood of its decision un-
leashing a flood of suits by aliens against foreign governments by noting that
the class of actions recognized as violations of international law is small. See
830 F.2d at 429. Although the class of actions involving violations of interna-
tional law may be small, the potential number of victims of such violations
throughout the world is enormous. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ToR-
TURE IN THE EIGHTIES 3 (1984) (between January 1980 and mid-1983, Amnesty
International interceded on behalf of 2,687 individuals believed to be in danger
of torture in 45 countries).
159. The Amerada Hess majority opinion actually anticipated such action.
See supra note 91.
160. This Comment proposes to amend the Alien Tort Statute, rather than
the FSIA, because of the ambiguity of the former statute's current language.
The FSIA's language, in contrast, plainly sets forth that statute's purpose. See
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
161. Professor Randall has proposed a comprehensive amendment to the
Alien Tort Statute that would clarify the proper application of the Alien Tort
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The amended statute should read as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States.1 6 2 No action shall be brought
under this section, however, against a foreign state as defined in
§1603 of this title.1 6 3
The proposed addition to the Alien Tort Statute narrows
the class of defendants within the statute's grant of jurisdiction,
but only to the extent necessary to prevent any overlap in juris-
diction between the Alien Tort Statute and the FSIA. The lim-
iting language precludes actions against only those defendants
who are entitled to immunity under the FSIA.'6 The proposal
clarifies and reinforces Congress's intent that the FSIA provide
the exclusive standards for resolving questions of foreign sover-
eign immunity. 65 At the same time, the proposed language
does not unnecessarily limit alien access to United States
courts. Under the proposed version of the Statute, aliens still
can bring human rights claims such as that in Filartiga against
former foreign officials 66 found in the United States. 67
Precluding alternative bases of jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns will further Congress's goal that immunity determi-
nations be made according to uniform standards. Additionally,
private parties who transact business with foreign governments
will continue to have redress in United States courts in accord-
Statute and define the international law violations the statute covers. See
Randall, supra note 57, at 511-32. Such a comprehensive proposal is beyond
the scope and focus of this Comment. Professor Randall's proposal aims at fa-
cilitating human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute. This Com-
ment's proposal, on the other hand, aims to effectuate congressional intent in
codifying standards for determining sovereign immunity issues by excluding
suits against foreign states from jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute.
162. This is the current text of the Alien Tort Statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1982).
163. Language in italics represents the proposed amendment. For the
FSIA's definition of "foreign state" see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b), quoted supra
note 36.
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b), quoted supra note 36.
165. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of con-
gressional intent in enacting the FSIA.
166. The FSIA does not include individuals acting on behalf of a state
within its definition of "foreign state." See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1982).
167. See discussion of Filartiga, supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
For a recent holding consistent with Filartiga, see Forti v. Suarez Mason, 672
F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Excluding foreign states from Alien Tort Stat-
ute jurisdiction does not conflict with Filartiga's interpretation of the statute.
Judge Kearse, a member of the three-judge panel that decided Filartiga, cited
that case with approval in her dissent in Amerada Hess. See Amerada Hess,
830 F.2d 421, 429 (2d Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
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ance with the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Finally,
supplemental recourse to the Alien Tort Statute will no longer
undermine the FSIA. Foreign governments will have clear
guidelines by which they can assess their liability to suit in
United States courts, thus enhancing foreign relations and en-
couraging international trade.
CONCLUSION
In denying Argentina's claim of sovereign immunity, the
majority opinion in Amerada Hess erroneously departed from
standards established in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Although a violation of international law, the Argentine mili-
tary attack on the tanker was not an appropriate subject for ju-
dicial inquiry in United States courts. The FSIA grants
complete immunity to foreign sovereigns, excepting only cer-
tain commercial or private activity. Official state acts such as
military actions do not fall within the FSIA's exceptions to for-
eign sovereign immunity.
Congress intended the FSIA to be the sole and exclusive
standard by which United States courts should decide claims of
foreign sovereign immunity. Resort to other jurisdictional stat-
utes, such as the Alien Tort Statute, undermines that standard
and could inundate the federal courts with claims by aliens
against foreign governments. This Comment's proposed
amendment to the Alien Tort Statute would prevent resort to
the statute in spurious attempts to establish jurisdiction over
claims barred by the FSIA.
Teresa M. O'Toole
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